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ABSTRACT 
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Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has turned out to be useful when two parties negotiate 
about a shared secret in order to establish an encrypted connection between them. To 
verify the public key, a certificate is used. The certificate is issued by a public, generally 
trusted third party Certificate Authority (CA). Usually, the web browsers have a list of 
trusted CAs. It is a well-known problem that the number of security risks increases 
when the number of CAs grows. A compromised CA can, by an attacker's malicious 
action or by a human error, issue a trusted certificate to a party who does not own the 
domain. 
 
The purpose of this Master of Science Thesis is to research the applications of the 
DANE protocol, which is standardized by the IETF. The research question is, how to 
validate a target receiver while negotiating the encrypted connection. Special focus is on 
the secure email system. The DANE protocol makes use of the existing Domain Name 
System (DNS) and its Security Extensions (DNSSEC). 
 
This Master of Science Thesis begins with a theoretical part, where the technical back-
ground and current techniques are introduced. The DANE protocol and its features are 
also considered in this chapter. The latter part considers the method in practice, and de-
scribes how DANE can be used for the certificate verification instead of CA. 
 
The testing phase proves that the deployment of DANE is not complex and the increase 
of delay and traffic are not significant. DANE provides the needed association between 
the DNSSEC's chain of trust and the received certificate.  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
TAMPEREEN TEKNILLINEN YLIOPISTO  
Tietotekniikan koulutusohjelma 
JÄMSÄ, TEEMU: DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities 
Diplomityö, 53 sivua 
Kesäkuu 2014 
Pääaine: Tietoliikenneverkot ja protokollat 
Tarkastaja: professori Jarmo Harju 
Avainsanat: DANE, TLSA, DNSSEC, Salattu sähköposti 
 
Salattuja tietoliikenneyhteyksiä luotaessa ja yhteistä salausavainta neuvoteltaessa voi-
daan käyttää hyväksi julkisen avaimen järjestelmää. Jotta toisen osapuolen oikeellisuus 
voidaan todentaa, sen julkinen avain verifioidaan sertifikaatilla, jonka myöntää julkinen, 
yleisesti luotettu varmentaja. Tietokoneiden selaimet yleensä automaattisesti luottavat 
yleisesti tunnettuihin varmentajiin. Varmentajien lukumäärän kasvaessa myös tietotur-
variski kasvaa. Tietomurron kohteeksi joutunut varmentaja voi hyökkääjien toimesta, tai 
vaikka vain epähuomiossa, julkaista luotetun sertifikaatin mille tahansa taholle, jolle se 
ei kuulu. 
 
Tässä diplomityössä tutkitaan IETF:n spesifioiman DANE-protokollan soveltuvuutta 
salatun tietoliikenneyhteyden kohteen todentamiseen. Erityisenä tarkastelukohteena 
ovat salatun sähköpostiyhteyden osapuolet. DANE-protokolla hyödyntää jo valmiiksi 
rakennettua, hierarkkista nimipalvelujärjestelmää (DNS) ja erityisesti sen turvallisuus-
laajennuksen (DNSSEC) avulla digitaalisesti allekirjoitettuja tietueita. 
 
Diplomityön alkuosassa käsitellään tutkimuksen teoreettinen osuus, jossa käydään läpi 
teknistä taustaa ja menetelmiä, jotka ovat nykypäivänä käytössä. Osiossa esitellään 
myös DANE-protokolla ja siihen liittyvät ominaisuudet. Diplomityön jälkimmäisessä 
osassa suoritetaan käytännönläheinen testaus, jossa DANE-protokollaa hyödynnetään 
sertifikaattien todentamisessa julkisten varmentajien sijaan. 
 
Testaus osoittaa, että DANE-protokollan käyttöönotto on helppoa olemassa olevaan 
DNSSECiin tukeutuen, eikä viive tai pakettiliikenteen määrä kasva kohtuuttomasti. 
DANE-protokolla luo tarvittavan siteen DNSSECin luottamusketjun ja kohteen sertifi-
kaatin välille ja parantaa näin järjestelmän tietoturvaa.  
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AD Authenticated Data. A DNSSEC message header bit. 
CA Certificate Authority. An organization who issues digital 
certificates. 
ccTLD Country Code Top Level Domains. A domain name space 
for a country. 
CD Checking Disabled. A DNSSEC message header bit. 
DANE Domain Name System based Authentication of Named En-
tities. A protocol, which provides an association between a 
domain name and a certificate. 
DER Distinguished Encoding Rules. An encoding syntax. 
DNS Domain Name System. A naming system for Internet. 
DNSKEY Domain Name System Public Key. A DNSSEC resource 
record type. 
DNSSEC Domain Name System Security Extensions. A security ex-
tension for DNS. 
DO Domain Name System Security Extensions OK. 
DS Delegation Signer. A DNSSEC resource record type. 
EDNS Extension Mechanisms for Domain Name System. 
gTLD Generic Top Level Domain. A general term for .com-, .net-, 
.org- and .gov-domains. 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force. The standardization or-
ganization. 
IoT Internet of Things. 
IP Internet Protocol. A protocol on the network layer. 
KSK Key Signing Key. One of the public keys for DNSSEC. 
M2M Machine to Machine. A connection between similar devic-
es. 
MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extension. A standard for email 
extensions. 
MTA Message Transfer Agent. A software for email transmission. 
MX Mail Exchange. A DNS record for email servers. 
NS Name Server. A DNS name server. 
NSD Name Server Daemon. A DNS name server software. 
NSEC Next Secure. A DNSSEC resource record type. 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure. An arrangement for public keys. 
PKIX Public Key Infrastructure (X.509). PKI, which uses X.509. 
PMI Privilege Management Infrastructure.  
PSK Pre-Shared Key. A symmetric secret key. 
RDATA Resource record Data. 
   viii 
 
RFC Request for Comments. Internet protocol standards pub-
lished by IETF. 
RR Resource Record. Contains specific information about an 
object. 
RRSIG Resource Record Digital Signature. A DNSSEC resource 
record type. 
S/MIME Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions. A standard 
for encryption and signing of MIME. 
SMIMEA Not an acronym. A resource record of DANE. 
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. A protocol for email trans-
mission. 
TCP Transmission Control Protocol. A transport layer protocol. 
TLD Top Level Domain. A domain name space level below the 
root zone. 
TLS Transport Layer Security. A cryptographic protocol.
TLSA Not an acronym. A resource record of DANE. 
TTL Time-To-Live. A pre-set lifetime. 
TXID Transaction Identifier. A 16 bit identification number for 
DNS. 
UDP User Datagram Protocol. A transport layer protocol. 
X.509 Not an acronym. A standard for a PKI and PMI. 
ZSK Zone Signing Key. One of the public keys for DNSSEC. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The communication between the various types of applications over the insecure Internet 
has led to a regrettable situation where the traffic is monitored, spoofed and eaves-
dropped and data packets are being tampered or forged. The security between the parties 
can be improved by using the Transport Layer Security (TLS), which provides a secure 
connection by encrypting the channel. 
 The provision of the security made by TLS is based on the mutual encryption, 
where the secrecy of the channel is provided, for example, by using secret, private keys 
of the parties. The provided channel encryption is as strong as the used cipher suite, 
which includes the authentication, encryption and algorithms. A weak secret can be re-
vealed, which leads to the case that the encryption of the channel could be compromised 
and there will be no security anymore. The worst case scenario is that this malicious 
action can be completely invisible to the original connection parties. 
 The authentication of TLS is based on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and 
one problem is, how to trust a key issued by another party. TLS has solved this problem 
by using certificates and Certificate Authorities (CA). The CAs are the trusted third par-
ty organizations, who sign the certificates to the TLS servers and services, and the TLS 
clients can verify those certificates by using the published public key of the CA. 
 But unfortunately, a trusted PKI system can only be as strong as the weakest 
CA. This enables one of the biggest security problems. When one CA is compromised, 
it can issue a replacement certificate to any other domain name. This malicious action 
can cause serious damage to millions of users. 
 The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) improves the relia-
bility and the data integrity of the Domain Name System (DNS) by building a chain of 
trust from the root by signing the untrusted keys associated to the domain name zones 
below it, so called child zones. DNSSEC is also based on public keys like the TLS, but 
instead of hundreds of different CAs, hierarchical DNSSEC has to trust in essence only 
the root. 
 The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) provides an associa-
tion between the reliable DNSSEC infrastructure and the TLS certificate verified by the 
CA. The DANE protocol allows the domain name administrator to store the public key 
of the TLS server to the DNS data. This associated public key must match the public 
key in the TLS certificate. This prevents fake certificates issued by compromised CAs. 
 This Master of Science Thesis introduces DANE and the reasons, which have 
led to its invention. The DANE-validated TLS encryption between email servers was 
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selected as a main study. Chapter 2 will go through the theoretical and technical back-
ground of the topic. At first, TLS and its functionality are presented. Then DNS, its 
functionality and vulnerabilities are very briefly presented. Thirdly, DNSSEC, its func-
tionality, building of the chain of trust and the DNSSEC’s challenges are also briefly 
presented. At last, the problems and the needs are considered before entering the next 
chapter. In Chapter 3, DANE is fully introduced. The chapter goes through the details of 
DANE, the TLSA record format and the TLSA record rollover. Some examples are also 
presented in Chapter 3. DANE and TLSA records with encrypted SMTP are described 
in more specifically. Chapter 4 introduces the test environment, which was built for 
testing the encrypted email transmissions with DANE TLSA records. These records 
were received via DNSSEC validated DNS responses. The chapter will go through the 
basic configuration and the testing phase. The test results found during the testing phase 
are considered and analyzed in Chapter 5. The conclusions of this thesis are presented in 
Chapter 6. 
 
 3 
2 BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents the theoretical and technical background of the subject. It goes 
through the techniques and methods which are nowadays widely used to provide a se-
cure connection between two parties, for example, a bank’s web server and a client’s 
home computer. 
 
2.1 Transport Layer Security 
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic protocol which uses symmetric 
secrecy to provide communication security over the Internet. In this chapter, the func-
tionality of TLS is briefly presented. The full functionality of the TLSv1 is explained in 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC 2246 standard in January 1999, the 
TLS version 1.1 in the IETF RFC 4346 standard in April 2006 and the current, upgrad-
ed TLS version 1.2 in the IETF RFC 5246 standard in August 2008. 
 
2.1.1 Functionality 
The goal of the TLS protocol is to build a secure connection between a client and a 
server over the insecure Internet. TLS is a key exchange protocol, which is divided into 
the two sub protocols: the TLS Record Protocol and the TLS Handshake Protocol. The 
TLS Record Protocol lies on top of the transport layer and it is used to encapsulate 
higher-level protocols. TLS uses the TLS Handshake Protocol to authenticate the ses-
sion parties and to negotiate the session cipher suites. The authentication is usually 
made by using the asymmetric Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). The connection is pri-
vate, and the symmetric secret key, which is then used to encrypt the application data, is 
privately negotiated for each connection. The generation of the symmetric secret key is 
made by using the public key of the session party, using the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) or 
using the both parties’ public keys. The handshake overview is shown in Figure 1, 
where the asterisk indicates optional messages whereas ChangeCipherSpec messages 
are in brackets because they are not actually TLS handshake messages but independent 
TLS protocol content types. [1] 
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Client Server
ClientHello
ServerHello
Certificate*
ServerKeyExchange*
CertificateRequest*
ServerHelloDone
Certificate*
ClientKeyExchange
CertificateVerify*
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished
[ChangeCipherSpec]
Finished
Application Data
 
Figure 1. The TLS handshake overview. 
  
 The handshake process begins when the client sends its ClientHello message to 
the server. The ClientHello message is used to identify the session and to inform the 
server about the security enhancement capabilities of the client. [1] 
 The server will respond to a ClientHello message by sending its own Server-
Hello message if it is able to support client’s cipher suite, which means a combination 
of security algorithms. Otherwise it will send a handshake failure alert. Then the server 
chooses the security policies, such as the cipher suite and the compression method from 
the list in ClientHello message. Immediately after the ServerHello message, the server 
will send a Certificate message, which conveys server’s certificate information to the 
client. Only an anonymous negotiation, where the key is pre-shared, will prevent the 
server from sending this message. Then, in some cases, the server will send the Serv-
erKeyExchange message. This message contains extra information, which allows the 
client to exchange the premaster secret. The server, which is a non-anonymous server, 
so it had to send the Certificate message, could also request a certificate from the client 
by sending a CertificateRequest message. And finally, the server will send a Server-
HelloDone message, which indicates that this is the end of ServerHello and associated 
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messages. The server has done its part of the key exchange and is now waiting for a 
client’s response. [1] 
 If the server requested a certificate, the client will first send its own certificate 
by sending a Certificate message. If the client does not have an appropriate certificate, it 
has to send a Certificate message without any actual certificates within. Then the client 
will send the mandatory ClientKeyExchange message. The premaster key is set with this 
message. If the Certificate message is sent, the client will next send a CertificateVerify 
message to verify its own certificate. At this point, the client will send the ChangeCi-
pherSpec message where it informs the server that the following records will be protect-
ed. The client ends its part of the handshake by sending a Finished message where it 
verifies that the key exchange was successful. The Finished message is the first mes-
sage, which is protected with the secret just negotiated. Now the client is just waiting 
for the server’s Finished message. [1] 
 The server will also send its ChangeCipherSpec and Finished messages in that 
particular order. When the client has received the server’s Finished message it is ready 
to send and receive the protected application data over the negotiated connection. [1] 
 
2.1.2 Considerations 
The goal of the TLS protocol is to provide a secure and reliable connection between two 
parties. The negotiation of a shared secret is unavailable to eavesdroppers and attackers 
in the middle of the connection. The modifications made by attackers can always be 
detected by the communication parties. The negotiated secret keys are for symmetric 
encryption and only for that particular connection. [1] 
 Before the private and reliable connection over the TLS is in use, the client has 
to solve the location of the target server before it can begin to negotiate the shared se-
cret. 
 
2.2 Domain Name System 
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a global, hierarchical naming system for the Inter-
net. It contains mappings between, for example, domain names, Internet Protocol (IP) 
addresses, text records, mail exchange records and name server information records. 
Thus, it allows clients to use memorable names, such as www.example.com, rather than 
IP addresses to find resources on the Internet.  
 DNS is an IETF standard and its original specifications were presented in the 
IETF RFC 882 and RFC 883 standards in November 1983. Four years later, in Novem-
ber 1987, they were displaced by the IETF RFC 1034 and RFC 1035 standards. Later 
on, the IETF has published several additional extension RFCs for DNS. At first in this 
chapter, the functionality of the DNS is briefly presented. Then, the framework and vul-
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nerability are presented before the last part of the chapter, where the results are revised. 
[2] 
 
2.2.1 Functionality 
The structure of DNS is hierarchical and tree-like and its domain name space starts at 
the root zone which is marked by using a dot symbol. From the top level root, the DNS 
name space hierarchy is divided into several sub domains as it is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Root ”.”
.arpa .fi .com
.tut .example.in-addr
www
 
Figure 2. The part of the domain name space tree-like hierarchy. 
 
The .arpa-domain is usually used for reverse mappings that are queries from addresses 
to hostnames. The .fi-domain is a country code top level domain (ccTLD) for Finland. 
The .com-domain is a generic TLD (gTLD). The root name server is aware of the do-
main name spaces below it. Like it is shown in Figure 2, the root knows, for example, 
the .com-domain which then knows the .example.com-domain which knows the address 
of the www-server.  
 If a client wants to connect to the www.example.com, the client’s DNS resolver 
has to resolve the IP address of the www.example.com. The procedure begins with a 
DNS query where the client’s DNS resolver asks about the IP address. The query is sent 
to the client’s domain name server. This is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The DNS query from the client’s  DNS resolver. 
 
If the name server’s cache is empty or it does not have any information about 
www.example.com, it has to ask it from the root server. The IP address of the root serv-
er is configured to the name server, so it can always ask at least from it. The root server 
query is shown in Figure 4. 
 
Root NS
www.example.com
Client
Name Server
2: DN
S qu
ery: 
www
.exam
ple.c
om
3: DN
S rep
ly: as
k TLD
 NS
 
Figure 4. Querying the root name server. 
 
If the queried hostname is valid, the root server knows where the response is found and 
replies that information to the resolving name server. In Figure 4, the root name server 
(NS) replies that it does not know the exact IP address of the queried 
www.example.com, but it knows the IP address of the TLD (also gTLD) NS for .com-
domain name space which should know the target IP address. Next, the resolving name 
server sends its query to the TLD NS. This is shown in Figure 5. 
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Name Server
Root NS
TLD NS
www.example.com
4: DNS query: www.example.com
5: DNS reply: ask .example.com NS
Client
 
Figure 5. Querying the TLD name server. 
 
In Figure 5, the resolving name server is now querying the .com-domain’s name server 
with the same query. Even if the query is still valid, the TLD NS does not know the ex-
act IP address for the queried www.example.com, but it knows the IP address of the 
.example.com-domain’s name server. TLD NS informs the resolving name server with 
that information. Then the resolving name server sends its query to the name server of 
the .example.com-domain. This is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Name Server
Root NS
TLD NS
www.example.com
6: DNS query: www.example.com
7: DNS reply: www.example.com is at 93.184.216.119Client
.example.com NS
 
Figure 6. Querying the target domain's name server. 
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In Figure 6, the resolving name server sends the same DNS query to the target domain’s 
name server which knows the exact IP address of the queried www server. It sends its 
response which informs the resolving name server that the IP address of the queried 
www.example.com is 93.184.216.119. Next, the resolving name server will end this 
query by sending the reply to the client’s resolver. This is shown in Figure 7. 
 
Name Server
Root NS
TLD NS
www.example.com
9: ClientHello
8: D
NS 
rep
ly: 
ww
w.e
xam
ple
.com
 is 
at 9
3.1
84.
216
.11
9
Client
.example.com NS
 
Figure 7. Finishing the query. 
 
In Figure 7, the resolving name server sends its reply to the client’s resolver and in that 
reply it informs that the IP address of the www.example.com is 93.184.216.119 and 
finally stores this mapping to its cache for a pre-set lifetime, Time To Live (TTL) value. 
Now the resolving name server has resolved the query by using a non-recursive (or an 
iterative) resolving method. The original query given by the client’s resolver was recur-
sive. 
 The client’s resolver has now received the response for the original query and 
has the IP address of the web server of the example.com-domain. The client’s applica-
tion, such as web browser begins to negotiate the connection with the web server. [2] 
 
2.2.2 Weaknesses 
In a normal case, the client is not suspicious about the reply received from the resolving 
name server.  The client assumes that the response can be relied on. But DNS does not 
provide strong authentication for the responses. There are several malicious attacks 
which can spoil or modify the correct DNS resource records and cause that the incorrect 
information is transmitted to the clients.  
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 In the DNS Cache Poisoning attack, an attacker does an active attack, which 
causes the resolving name server to approve an incorrect DNS data and to store it to its 
cache. This malicious method is presented in Figure 8. 
 
.example.com NS
www.example.com
Malicious Server
IP: 192.168.1.200
Client
1: D
NS 
que
ry:
ww
w.e
xam
ple
.co
m
2: D
NS
 qu
ery
: w
ww
.ex
am
ple
.co
m
4: D
NS 
rep
ly: 
ww
w.e
xam
ple
.co
m i
s at
 93
.18
4.2
16.
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3: DNS reply: www.example.com is at 192.168.1.200
Attacker
6: ClientHello
5: D
NS 
rep
ly: 
ww
w.e
xam
ple
.co
m
is a
t 19
2.1
68.
1.2
00
Name Server
 
Figure 8. The DNS Cache Poisoning attack. 
 
In Figure 8, the client’s resolver normally sends a recursive DNS query to its domain’s 
resolving name server which then iteratively begins to solve the IP address by sending 
the query (in this case) to the .example.com-domain’s name server. The .example.com-
domain’s name server normally responds by sending a DNS reply, where it informs, 
that the target web server is located at the 93.184.216.119, but the reply is dropped by 
the resolving name server because the reply, sent by the attacker, is received first. The 
resolving name server will accept the first reply with the correct transaction identifier 
(TXID) and the correct User Datagram Protocol (UDP) source port for a DNS query 
message. The resolving name server will store this malicious resource record to its 
cache for a pre-set TTL-value. This incorrect information is also transmitted to the cli-
ent who then with no doubt believes that the www.example.com is located at 
192.168.1.200 instead of 93.184.216.119 and begins to negotiate the connection with 
the malicious web server. [2; 3; 4] 
 DNS is a well-functioning and dynamic system but unfortunately it is also very 
vulnerable to different malicious actions. Its internal functionality does not provide 
proper protection against these attacks and the framework to build one is insufficient. 
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2.3 Domain Name System Security Extensions 
The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) expand the vulnerable DNS 
by providing a data origin authentication and data integrity by associating cryptograph-
ically generated digital signatures. By using DNSSEC, a DNS client can be sure that the 
received DNS reply and its contained information about the target location’s IP address 
are reliable. This will ensure that the IP address belongs to the particularly required do-
main name. DNSSEC does not provide data confidentiality. [5] 
 DNSSEC’s first specification, which was introduced in the IETF RFC 2535 
standard in March 1999, has become obsolete by newer IETF RFC 4033, RFC 4034 and 
RFC 4035 standards in March 2005. At first, in this chapter, the functionality of the 
DNSSEC is briefly presented. 
 
2.3.1 General 
DNSSEC is a set of extensions, which offer a data origin authentication, data integrity 
and an authenticated denial of data existence. In order to provide those, DNSSEC re-
quired some changes to the DNS protocol. Four new resource record (RR) types were 
added: two new message header bits, a support for larger DNS messages sizes and a 
support for querying DNSSEC data in response messages. [6] 
 The first of four new RR types is the DNS Public Key (DNSKEY) RR. DNS-
KEY RR contains the public keys, which are used in the DNSSEC authentication pro-
cess. The second RR type is the resource record digital signature (RRSIG), which stores 
the digital signatures used in the DNSSEC authentication chain. The third RR type is 
the Next Secure (NSEC) and its latest version NSEC3, which authenticates denial of 
existence. The fourth RR type is the delegation signer (DS), which provides hierarchical 
authentication between the child zone and the parent zone. [7] 
 Two new message header bits are Checking Disabled (CD) bit and Authenticat-
ed Data (AD) bit. These bits are used for communication between security-aware re-
solvers and security-aware recursive name servers. The CD bit allows a security-aware 
resolver to disable signature validation. The AD bit is set by the security-aware name 
server if and only if the RRs in the response are authentic. [8] 
 By setting the DNSSEC OK (DO) bit on the resolver informs the server that it is 
able to accept DNSSEC RRs [9]. The DO bit is included to the Extension Mechanisms 
for DNS (EDNS) which allows, for example, larger message size for the DNS packet 
that DNSSEC requires [10]. 
 
2.3.2 Functionality 
The DNSSEC is an extension for the DNS, thus the basic structure and functionality are 
the same. The client’s DNS resolver first sends the DNS query message to the resolving 
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name server. The difference compared to the standard DNS process is that the DO bit is 
set and the client’s resolver accepts and can handle DNSSEC replies. The beginning of 
the DNS process with the DNSSEC support is shown in Figure 9.  
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Name Server
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S que
ry: w
ww.e
xamp
le.co
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O bit
 = 1
3: DN
S rep
ly: as
k TLD
 NS, 
AD b
it = 1
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ry:
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ple.c
om
DO b
it = 1
Root NS
 DS: Authentication for .com
 RRSIG: Signed by Root
 DNSKEY: Public keys for Root
www.example.com  
Figure 9. The DNS query to the root with DNSSEC. 
 
If the recursive and resolving name server does not have DNS entries related to the que-
ried www.example.com entry, it begins the query from the root server and also sets the 
DO bit to 1. Since the DO bit is a part of and defined by the EDNS all the devices must 
support it. The root server has the information about the .com TLD’s name server and it 
replies. It also detects the set DO bit so it includes the various DNSSEC resource rec-
ords into the DNS response and sets the AD bit to 1.  
There are two different types of keys the root has and the public ones are stored 
in the DNSKEY RR. The Zone Signing Key (ZSK) is for signing the zones and the Key 
Signing Key (KSK) for signing the keys. The public keys of the root are verified by the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and well-known Cer-
tificate Authority (CA), VeriSign, Inc., and the root has signed its own certificate by 
using its own private ZSK since July, 2010. This signature is stored in the RRSIG.  
The root works as a parent zone to the TLD .com child zone. The root has signed 
the KSK for the TLD .com by using the root’s ZSK and stored this information to the 
DS RR. Thus, the root and the TLD .com have created a chain of trust between each 
other. Because of this, any DNSSEC zone, which completes the chain of trust from the 
root, can be validated by using the root trust anchor. [7] 
  When the response from the root is received, the resolving name server sends a 
query to the TLD name server as can be seen in Figure 10. 
 
 13 
Client
Name Server
5: DNS reply: ask .example.com NS, AD bit = 1
Root NS
 DS: Authentication for .example.com
 RRSIG: Signed by .com
 DNSKEY: Public keys for .com
TLD NS
4: DNS query: www.example.com, DO bit = 1
www.example.com  
Figure 10. The DNS query to TLD NS with DNSSEC. 
 
The query is the same and the DO bit is set. The TLD .com name server does not have 
information about www.example.com server, but it has information about .example.com 
name server’s location. The TLD .com name server responds to the resolving name 
server and because the DNSSEC is admitted, it adds the DNSSEC RRs to the response 
message and sets the AD bit to 1.  
 The DNSKEY record contains the public ZSK and KSK keys for the .com zone. 
These are the same keys that the root zone has signed and stored in its own DS record 
field seen in Figure 9. The RRSIG record contains .com zone’s own signature. The DS 
contains authenticated public keys for the .example.com zone which the .com zone has 
signed by using its KSK. [7] 
 When the response from the TLD is received, the resolving name server then 
queries the name server of the .example.com zone as shown in Figure 11.  
 
www.example.com
Client
Name Server
7: DNS reply: www .example.com is at 93.184.216.119, AD bit = 1
Root NS
 A: 93.184.216.119
 RRSIG: Signed by .example.com
 DNSKEY: Public keys for .example.com
TLD NS
6: DNS query: www.example.com, DO bit = 1
.example.com NS
 
Figure 11. The DNS query to the .example.com name server with DNSSEC. 
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As requested, the .example.com name server also responds with the DNSSEC infor-
mation instead of just the normal DNS reply. With these DNSSEC records, 
.example.com name server informs the resolving name server. The public ZSK and 
KSK keys, which .com zone authenticated, are stored into the DNSKEY record, the 
RRSIG record is signed by the .example.com zone’s own signature and a normal A rec-
ord, which contains the location (that is IP address) of the www.example.com server. 
All the records are authenticated so the AD bit is still set. [7] 
 The resolving name server then forwards this received information to the client’s 
resolver, which received the response to its original query and now has the IP address of 
the queried web server of the .example.com. Now the client’s web browser can begin to 
negotiate the connection between the client and the web server. This process is shown in 
Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. The final step on the path of the DNS query with DNSSEC. 
 
The DNS query process with the DNSSEC has finished and, for example, the TLS 
handshake process has begun. 
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2.3.3 Chain of Trust 
The idea of the DNSSEC is to provide a global system, which offers reliable DNS en-
tries. The DS RR provides an authentication chain between the trusted root and the des-
tination web server. The term "chain of trust" is based on the structure, where, at first, 
the root is publicly well-known and verified. Then the root authenticates its child TLD 
zone, for example, .com zone, which then authenticates its child zone (in this case, 
.example.com zone). The .example.com name server is now authenticated and knows 
the IP address of the web server, that is, it responds with the A record, so the resolving 
name server and the client’s resolver can be sure, that the IP address belongs to the cor-
rect, queried domain name. [8] 
 A parent can delegate an authentication to the child. When the child domain 
name is already registered under a TLD there is one authentication mechanism to use to 
become secure. For example, if the child .example.com zone is upgrading its DNS to 
DNSSEC and its parent zone, .com, is already using DNSSEC, the following tasks have 
to be taken. 
 
1. The .example.com generates a public-private key pair. 
2. The .example.com signs its own zone. 
3. The .example.com informs the .com parent zone about its preparedness. 
4. The .com checks the IP addresses of the NSs of the .example.com by check-
ing the TLD database. 
5. The .com gets the .example.com’s key by using DNS. 
6. The .com traceroutes the .example.com. 
7. Depending on the validations, the .com either signs or drops the key and in-
forms the registrant and the domain holder. 
8. The .com inserts the signed DS RR to its own zone. 
9. The .example.com receives an acknowledgement response from the .com. 
 
It is very crucial at these early steps to keep the possible attackers out and prevent them 
from getting involved in any cases. The worst result may be that the attacker rules the 
whole zone. [21] 
 It is at the security-aware name server’s responsibility to verify DNSSEC signa-
tures. It trusts to the authenticated root’s public KSK key. The authentication of the root 
zone is made by the root itself by using the private half of the public-private ZSK key 
pair. The root’s public ZSK key has been signed by the private half of the public-private 
KSK key pair. The authentication of the root zone can be made by using the public half 
of the public-private ZSK key pair and the authentication of the ZSK public key can be 
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made by using the public half of the public-private KSK key pair, which is already 
trusted.  
 The beginning of the chain of trust is shown in Figure 13, where ICANN has 
verified the root's public KSK key, which private half has signed the root's public ZSK 
key, which private half has signed the root zone. This root zone has information of the 
.com zone. [5; 7; 11] 
 In Figure 13, by the syntax 

XKSK  is meant, that the public KSK is managed by 
X and by the syntax 

XKSK  is meant, that the private KSK is managed by X. The same 
syntax applies for the ZSKs.  
 

ROOTKSK

ROOTKSK
Verifies
Signs
ROOTZSK

ROOTZSK Signs
ROOT ZONE
.com DS
 
Figure 13. The authentication method of the root zone. 
 
 The DS RR is the authentication chain link between the DNS zone boundaries. 
The DS RR field contains the digest of the child zone’s DNSKEY RR field, it refers to. 
The referred DNSKEY RR is, in this case, the .com zone’s DNSKEY RR. The digest is 
a hash of the DNSKEY owner name and the data, which contains the flag, the protocol, 
the algorithm and the public key. [7] 
 Next, the security-aware name server receives the response from the TLD .com 
zone’s name server. It already has received the DS RR for this zone so it has the hash of 
the public KSK key for this particular zone and by using this information the security-
aware name server can verify the ZSK and so on the whole .com zone. This process is 
shown in Figure 14. [7] 
 
 17 

comKSK .
Refers
Signs
comZSK .

comZSK . Signs
.com ZONE
.example.com DS
.com DS

comKSK .
 
Figure 14. The authentication method of the .com zone. 
 
As in the response from the root, also in the response from the .com name server there is 
the DS RR field, which now contains the DNSKEY RR field digest of the .com zone’s 
child zone, which, in this case, is the .example.com zone. 
 The verified DS RR now authenticates the following DNS response message’s 
DNSSEC records received next from the .example.com zone’s name server and shown 
in Figure 15. 
 

comexampleKSK ..

comexampleKSK ..
Refers
Signs
comexampleZSK ..
Signs .example.com
ZONE
A: IP address
.example.com DS

comexampleZSK ..
 
Figure 15. The authentication method of the .example.com zone. 
 
By using the public KSK key, the security-aware name server can verify the 
.example.com zone and also the A record, which contains the IP address of the queried 
domain name. [7] 
 The chain of trust for this particular case is shown in Figure 16. 
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
ROOTKSK

ROOTKSK
Verifies
Signs
ROOTZSK

ROOTZSK Signs
ROOT ZONE

comKSK .
Refers
Signs
comZSK .

comZSK . Signs
.com ZONE
.com DS

comKSK .

comexampleKSK ..

comexampleKSK ..
Refers
Signs
comexampleZSK ..
Signs .example.com
ZONE
A: IP address
.example.com DS

comexampleZSK ..
 
Figure 16. The chain of trust for this case. 
 
The chain of trust lies on the globally trustworthy root, which is the topmost parent or it 
lies on a Trust Anchor, which is obtained to the validating security-aware name server 
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via methods outside the DNS protocol. The Trust Anchor is a configured DNSKEY RR 
or a DS RR, which the validating security-aware name server will use, instead of the 
root, as a starting point for building the chain of trust. [5] 
 
2.3.4 Challenges of DNSSEC 
Improved security increases the complexity significantly, which leads to the situation, 
where increased baseline expertise is also required in every zone using DNSSEC. The 
implementation of DNSSEC to the global, existing and continuously expanding Internet 
and its hierarchical DNS produced in different ways needs a standard and methods 
which are highly compatible. Many operators and organizations have to update their 
DNS software and might have to upgrade their DNS hardware. The delays and the re-
sponse times increase during DNS lookups because of the extra processing times needed 
for the key and signature verifications. In Figure 17, the performance of DNSSEC com-
pared to the queries without it is presented. 
 
 
Figure 17. The performance of DNSSEC [17, p. 19]. 
 
In Figure 17, the ”A” (red line) corresponds to the queries with the DNSSEC-validating 
resolver, the “B” (blue line) corresponds to the queries with the non-DNSSEC-
validating resolver and the “C” (green line) corresponds to the queries with the DNS-
SEC-validating resolver, but the bad signature leads to the failure of the validation. It is 
shown in Figure 17, that almost 20 percent of all the queries that use the DNSSEC have 
a response time longer than one second, whereas in queries, which do not use the DNS-
SEC, the corresponding percent is less than 5 percent. It is also shown, that the bad sig-
nature causes more than 10 second response times to more than 15 percent of the que-
ries. Overall, the DNSSEC might cause a slower user experience to most of the end us-
ers even though the whole DNS process should be invisible to them. [12; 16] 
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 One of the biggest challenges is the key management, which includes the key 
storing, key generation and key replacement, called rollover. The KSK is used to sign a 
key set, which has a minor operational effect, because it signs only a little section of the 
zone data. The KSK can be made stronger and that is why it can be updated much less 
frequently than other keys. The KSK is the long-term key, which is usually changed 
once in a year or two. It is crucial, that the private half of the KSK public-private key 
pair is stored offline and in a safe location. [13; 15] 
 The ZSK is a short-term key and is changed more frequently, usually once in a 
month or two. Differentiating the KSK and the ZSK, allows the zone administrator to 
update the ZSK and to re-sign the zone data by using this new ZSK, re-signed with the 
KSK, without negotiating with the parent zone. [13; 15] 
 The keys need to be changed periodically, because the probability of a key get-
ting compromised because of carelessness, accident, espionage or cryptanalysis increas-
es the longer the key is in use. The more frequently the keys are changed, the more dif-
ficult it is for the attacker to perform its malicious actions. The rollover process for the 
KSK needs to be done in cooperation with the parent DNSSEC zone. The process be-
gins with the initial state where the parental DS RR points to the child’s current DNS-
KEY. Time takes a crucial part in the DNSSEC rollovers, so the child has to be accurate 
with the TTL values of that DS RR mentioned above.  
 The next step is called the “new DNSKEY” phase, where the zone administrator 
generates a new KSK. When this new key is delivered to the parent, the parent will gen-
erate and publish a new DS RR, which points to the new DNSKEY. When the TTL ex-
pires the parent replaces the old DS RR with the new DS RR. The child removes the old 
DNSKEY. This process is based on the Double-Signature Key Signing Key Rollover. 
There are a few rollover variants. In a Double-DS Key Signing Key Rollover, the parent 
has two different DS RRs at the same time, which are pointing to the two different 
DNSKEY respectively until the TTL expires. In a Straightforward Rollover in a Single-
Type Signing Scheme, a new DNSKEY is presented and all the RRsets are signed with 
the old DNSKEY and the new DNSKEY until the TTL expires. In a Double-DS Rollo-
ver in a Single-Type Signing Scheme, a new DNSKEY and a new DS RR are provided 
to the parent. The new DNSKEY is not yet used to sign the RRsets until the TTL ex-
pires. [14; 15] 
 There are two different methods to ensure that during the rollover for the ZSK, 
the zone can still be verified. The first method is called the Pre-Publish Zone Signing 
Key Rollover and the second method is called the Double-Signature Zone Signing Key 
Rollover.  
 The Pre-Publish Zone Signing Key Rollover has four steps. The First step is 
called the Initial step, which presents the current state. The next step is called the “new 
DNSKEY” step, where the new ZSK is introduced but it has not been used yet to gener-
ate the new signatures. The next step, in which the data in the zone is signed, is called 
the “new RRSIGs” step. The new ZSK is used to generate the signatures in the zone and 
all the old signatures generated by the old ZSK are removed from the zone. The old 
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ZSK still remains valid, so the cached data can still be verified until the TTL expires. 
The last step is called the “DNSKEY removal” step, where the old ZSK is removed and 
only the new ZSK remains. The whole key set is re-signed with the current KSK. [15] 
 This Pre-Publish Zone Signing Key Rollover method can be simplified by gen-
erating the next ZSK and introducing it right after the rollover. The new ZSK remains 
stored until the next rollover phase. [15] 
 The second method is called the Double-Signature Zone Signing Key Rollover. 
There are three steps in this method. The first step is called the Initial step, which pre-
sents the current state. The next step is called the “new DNSKEY” step. In this step, the 
new ZSK is introduced and all the zone data is signed with this new ZSK. There is a 
phase, when all the zone data is signed with the new ZSK and also with the old ZSK 
until the TTL expires and the old ZSK and all its signatures will be removed at the last 
“DNSKEY removal” step. Only the new ZSK remains and the whole key set is re-
signed with the current KSK. [15] 
 
2.4 Problems and Needs 
DNS is a critical infrastructure of the Internet because it is in use everywhere and be-
cause the Internet, as it is known nowadays, would not work without it. DNS has re-
mained almost the same from the beginning, even if many things around it have 
changed. When DNS was developed, there were none of those threats, which are mali-
cious to DNS and which exist nowadays. DNS has no protection against them. That is, 
why DNSSEC was developed.  
 In the DNSSEC system, all the parents can delegate authentication forward to 
their children to achieve an unbroken chain of trust. In the steps of authentication dele-
gation, there is a great responsibility for the DNS operators and DNSSEC registrants to 
provide a reliable mechanism to confirm a child’s trustworthiness. 
 DNSSEC provides a sufficient reliability and data integrity to DNS. DNS's re-
sponses to the client’s resolver are verified and valid. The client’s web browser begins 
to negotiate a TLS connection between a bank’s web server and itself. It has a verified 
IP address where to send a “clientHello” message. After a while, the client receives a 
response from the server, which includes a server’s certificate. By verifying this certifi-
cate, the server is authenticated. The verifying is done by the third party CA. The 
browser trusts by default a certain amount of CAs, which are already configured to the 
system. Any of these CAs could verify any other domain. That means the weakest CA 
defines the reliability. Unfortunately, there have been the breaches, for example in 
March 2011, a malicious attacker managed to obtain digital certificates including 
Google, Yahoo and Skype from the CA Comodo [19] and in August 2011, an another 
breach in DigiNotar, which issued a digital certificate for google.com to someone, who 
is not Google [20]. These breaches allowed attackers to use what is known as a man-in-
 22 
the-middle attack to monitor any traffic including passwords and emails, even if the 
traffic was protected with an encrypted TLS connection [19]. 
 As it is shown in Figure 18, when the client receives a valid and DNSSEC veri-
fied response from the NS, there is still a possibility for an attacker to perform a man-in-
the-middle attack to the TLS connection. 
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Figure 18. Man-in-the-Middle attack. 
   
The malicious web server has a valid certificate issued by a weak CA and because the 
client’s web browser trusts the weak CA, the client believes to communicate with the 
correct, trustworthy web server. The attacker can now eavesdrop all the client's pass-
words and other personal data. There is clearly a need for a relation between the DNS-
SEC records and the TLS certificate. It assures that a client uses the predetermined cer-
tificate. 
 DNSSEC does not protect against human made errors. If the client is attempting 
to connect to the web server locating at www.example.com and he/she, by misspelling 
the domain name, enters to the web site located at www.example.org, which currently 
could be under the attacker’s control. The fake web site could look exactly the same as 
the original one and nothing can prevent the client to reveal his/her secrets to the attack-
er. 
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3 DANE 
This chapter introduces the theoretical and technical perspective to the main subject, the 
DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE). The general information, full 
functionality, the protocol structure and the different applications of the DANE are pre-
sented in detail.  
 
3.1 Utilization 
The DANE protocol was developed to improve the TLS authentication by allowing the 
domain name administrators to bind their used certificates to the DNS names using the 
DNSSEC and a new resource record type [25]. By doing this, the domain name admin-
istrator defines which particular certificate issued by the CA is valid for the TLS con-
nection. A security-aware client with DANE support can see the “lock” icon, which 
signifies that the connection can is encrypted, but he/she can also be sure that the TLS 
certificate, which is used to encrypt the connection, is the one the domain administrator 
wants it to be. The DANE protocol specification brings also the opportunity to use the 
domain administrator's own self-signed certificates without using the third party CA. 
[30; 31] 
 This protocol specification uses the TLSA resource records (TLSA RRs), which 
are received by using the DNS query and validated by using the DNSSEC, to verify a 
secure TLS negotiation. The DNSSEC validation state [5] must be secure, so that the 
TLSA RR can be used and the secure TLS handshake can begin. The received TLSA 
RR, which includes information about the used certificate, is compared to the certifi-
cate, received from the TLS server during the TLS handshake. [22; 29] 
 The DANE-aware browser, or the browser add-on application, can warn the cli-
ent if the certificate sent by the TLS server does not match to the TLSA record verified 
by DNSSEC. The connection under negotiation may become insecure. The successful 
DANE validation is shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. TLS handshake with TLSA record. 
 
 The DANE working group has introduced DANE in the IETF RFC 6698 stand-
ard in August 2012. Further applications, such as DANE-compatibility with, for exam-
ple, the email has already been considered and the IETF Internet-Drafts has been devel-
oped. 
 
3.2 TLSA 
The association between the domain name and the TLS server certificate or the public 
key is created by using the TLSA RR, which includes certificate usage field, selector 
field matching type field one-octet each and the certificate association data field. The 
TLSA resource record data (RDATA) is shown in Figure 20. 
 
Certificate Association Data
Certificate Usage Selector Matching Type
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
 
Figure 20. RDATA for TLSA [22]. 
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3.2.1 Certificate Usage Field 
The value of the certificate usage field defines how to associate the introduced certifi-
cate during the TLS handshake and must be represented as an 8-bit unsigned integer. 
The values from zero to three are defined. The values from 4 to 254 are unassigned and 
the value 255 is for the private use. This is shown in Table 1. [22] 
 
Table 1. TLSA certificate usages and proposed acronyms [26, p. 3]. 
Value Acronym Description 
0 PKIX-TA CA constraint 
1 PKIX-EE Service certificate constraint 
2 DANE-TA Trust anchor assertion 
3 DANE-EE Domain-issued certificate 
4 – 254  Unassigned 
255 PrivCert Reserved for Private Use 
 
 The value 0 is used for a CA constraint certificate usage. This means, that the 
presented certificate, by the server in the TLS, must pass the validation and a certificate 
from the TLSA record must be a part of that exact validation process. This certificate 
usage limits the number of the CAs issuing the certificates for that particular server. 
[22] 
 The value 1 is used for a service certificate constraint usage. This means, that the 
presented certificate, by the server in the TLS, must match the certificate presented in 
the TLSA record. This limits the number of certificates used for validation. [22] 
  The value 2 is used for a trust anchor assertion, which allows the administrator 
of the domain name to define a new trust anchor, which is presented in the TLSA rec-
ord. The certificate, given by the TLS server, must pass the validation process using this 
new trust anchor. [22] 
 The value 3 is used for a domain-issued certificate usage, which allows the ad-
ministrator of the domain name to present its own certificates without using a third party 
CA. The presented certificate, by the TLS server, and the certificate in the TLSA record 
must match. [22] 
 
3.2.2 Selector Field 
The value of the selector field defines how the certificate will be matched and must be 
represented as an 8-bit unsigned integer. The values from zero to one are defined. The 
values from 2 to 254 are unassigned and the value 255 is for the private use only. This is 
shown in Table 2. [22] 
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Table 2. TLSA selectors and proposed acronyms [26, p. 3]. 
Value Acronym Description 
0 Cert Full certificate 
1 SPKI SubjectPublicKeyInfo 
2 – 254  Unassigned 
255 PrivSel Reserved for Private Use 
 
 The value 0 is used, when the full certificate binary structure is used to match 
the received certificate against the associated data in TLSA RR. The value 1 is used, 
when the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo binary 
structure is used to match the received certificate against the associated data in TLSA 
RR. [22; 23] 
 
3.2.3 Matching Type Field 
The value of the matching type field defines the format of the associated certificate and 
must be represented as an 8-bit unsigned integer. The values from zero to two are de-
fined, the values from 3 to 254 are unassigned and the value 255 is for the private use 
only. This is shown in Table 3. [22] 
 
Table 3. TLSA matching types and proposed acronyms [26, p. 3]. 
Value Acronym Description 
0 Full No hash used 
1 SHA2-256 256 bit hash by SHA2 
2 SHA2-512 512 bit hash by SHA2 
3 – 254  Unassigned 
255 PrivMatch Reserved for Private Use 
 
 The value 0 is used, when no hashes are used and the associated certificate is 
raw data [22]. The value 1 is used, when the associated certificate is hashed by using a 
SHA-256 algorithm [22; 24]. Either the value 0 or value 1 is mandatory. The hash, 
made by the SHA-256 algorithm is very compact and is recommended to use. 
 The optional value 2 is used, when the associated certificate is hashed by using a 
SHA-512 algorithm [22; 24]. The hash, made by the SHA-512 algorithm is rarely used 
and commonly reserved for the future use. 
 
3.2.4 Certificate Association Data Field 
The value of the certificate association data field defines the value to be compared and 
must be represented as a string of hexadecimal characters. The format of this data field 
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depends on the selector and the matching type fields and refers to the certificate given 
by the TLS server. [22] 
 
3.2.5 TLSA RR Format 
The TLSA RR example, where the SHA-512 hash is used to hash the association of a 
Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) (PKIX) CA certificate: 
 
 _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA ( 
  0  0  2  17a4eab60f01c264f4d30c07851c4041 
   88c8d3120986839b26ce238a3d2fc9ed 
   640bd42d9fb9c9797fea6de814cbb16b 
   f7671ae47575119011442216f64a9608 ) 
 
Another TLSA RR example, where the SHA-256 hash is used to hash the Sub-
jectPublicKeyInfo association by using the domain administrator’s own certificate: 
 
 _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA ( 
  3  1  1 bc8397af9b208bc64efb756938ae5766 
   86ee66321265366b3a441ee42acaf6ab ) 
 
The first example again by using the proposed acronyms [26], which are easier to re-
member and more informative than the numeric values: 
 
 _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA (  
  PKIX-TA  Cert  SHA2-512 
   17a4eab60f01c264f4d30c07851c4041 
   88c8d3120986839b26ce238a3d2fc9ed 
   640bd42d9fb9c9797fea6de814cbb16b 
   f7671ae47575119011442216f64a9608 ) 
 
The domain name prefix contains the port number on which the TLS service exists and 
the transport protocol name, which is used in the communication. The port number is 
the left-most label indicated with the underscore character and the protocol name is the 
second left-most label also indicated with the underscore character. The domain name is 
the TLS server’s fully qualified DNS domain name. The “IN” indicates the Internet 
class value. TLSA is the RRtype. The hash is added to the Certificate Association Data 
field. [22] 
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3.2.6 Record Rollover 
Suppose the .example.com domain zone has one TLSA record for a TLS service on the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 443: 
 
 _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA ( 
  0  0  2  17a4eab60f01c264f4d30c07851c4041 
   88c8d3120986839b26ce238a3d2fc9ed 
   640bd42d9fb9c9797fea6de814cbb16b 
   f7671ae47575119011442216f64a9608 ) 
 
The rollover process is very similar with the rollover process for a DNSSEC ZSKs by 
using the pre-publish rollover method [15]. Before the rollover process can begin, the 
new TLSA record must be generated by using the new certificate or SubjectPublicKey-
Info and added that new TLSA record alongside the old TLSA record: 
 
 _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA ( 
  0  0  2  17a4eab60f01c264f4d30c07851c4041 
   88c8d3120986839b26ce238a3d2fc9ed 
   640bd42d9fb9c9797fea6de814cbb16b 
   f7671ae47575119011442216f64a9608 ) 
 
 _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA ( 
  0  0  2  8cb5b2fb8ed98c0866a765ae63f2dbff  
   8c8cf6dd4c2a59af08fc395bbda85bd3 
   50649b39fab1d35a99aa0bcafba0341c 
   54d8efc07711707bb8589fdbc8cfe9ea ) 
 
These new records are distributed to the authoritative name servers. When the current 
certificate for the TLS server expires, it is switched to the new one and when this is 
done, the old TLSA record is obsolete and can be removed: 
 
  
 
 _443._tcp.www.example.com. IN TLSA ( 
  0  0  2  8cb5b2fb8ed98c0866a765ae63f2dbff  
   8c8cf6dd4c2a59af08fc395bbda85bd3 
   50649b39fab1d35a99aa0bcafba0341c 
   54d8efc07711707bb8589fdbc8cfe9ea ) 
 
The rollover is completed. [22] 
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3.3 SMIMEA 
The Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) latest version is presented 
in the IETF RFC 5751 –standard in January 2010. The purpose of S/MIME is to provide 
cryptographic security to the Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) data such 
as authentication, message integrity, privacy and data encryption [27]. The specifica-
tions and the functionalities of MIME and S/MIME are not presented in this thesis. 
 SMIMEA is a new DNS resource record type, which provides association be-
tween the domain name administrator’s certificates and S/MIME by using the secured 
DNS the same way as DANE. This RRtype work is in progress and is proposed in the 
Internet Draft by IETF. [28] 
 
3.3.1 Utilization 
To associate a public key or a certificate with the associated email address the SMIMEA 
DNS RR is used. The format of the SMIMEA is similar to the TLSA format presented 
in Figure 20. Also the certificate usage field format, presented in Table 1, the selector 
field format, presented in Table 2, and the matching type field format, presented in Ta-
ble 3 have the same semantics as the TLSA record. The hash is added to the Certificate 
Association Data field. [28] 
 
3.3.2 SMIMEA RR Format 
The “alice@example.com” email address is divided to the left-hand side “alice”, called 
the “local-part”, and to the right-hand side “example.com”, called the “domain”. The 
separator of these sides is the “@” character which is not included in the SMIMEA RR 
format. [28] 
 The “local-part” is hashed by using an SHA2-224 algorithm and it becomes the 
left-most label. The SHA2-224 hash for “alice” is  
 
 38b7e5d5651aaf85694a7a7c6d5db1275af86a6df93a36b8a4a2e771 . 
 
The second-most label is a string “_smimecert”. The third-most label is the “domain” 
part. The prepared domain name consists of the previous labels separated with the “.” 
character. The completed domain name is 
 
 38b7e5d5651aaf85694a7a7c6d5db1275af86a6df93a36b8a4a2e771.  
 _smimecert.example.com. 
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The SMIMEA RR is generated in the same way as the TLSA RR. The SMIMEA RR for 
the “alice@example.com” is 
  
 38b7e5d5651aaf85694a7a7c6d5db1275af86a6df93a36b8a4a2e771.  
 _smimecert.example.com. IN SMIMEA ( 
 0  0  2 8385c57671fc9bc2f157fa9b6e2ad84d 
  36dc5a35007ed8e55f3aa2ece410cd9f  
  c1892a087310043c07d807c55634ed7 
  af31149aa3a9d9dcc06a09db9ecff0d35 ).  
[28] 
 
3.4 DANE for SMTP 
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) was developed for email transmission between 
Message Transfer Agents (MTAs), such as the sender’s email server and the receiver’s 
email server. It was first defined in August 1982 in IETF RFC 821 –standard and the 
latest update was defined in October 2008 in IETF RFC 5321 –standard [32]. The fur-
ther specifications or functionalities of the SMTP are not presented in this thesis. 
 DANE TLSA DNS record provides SMTP transport security between MTAs 
when the location of the destination SMTP server is received via DNS Mail Exchange 
(MX) records. The usage of DANE TLSA for SMTP security is proposed in the IETF 
Internet-Draft and the work is in progress. [33] 
 
3.4.1 SMTP without DANE 
There are several serious vulnerabilities when an email is sent today. In the normal case, 
a client sends its email to the MTA, which is the sender’s email server. The sender’s 
MTA begins the DNS query and from the received DNS reply it uses the receiver’s 
DNS MX records to locate the destination MTA, which is the receiver’s email server. 
At this point, the sender's MTA sends the email to the destination email server, which 
then informs the recipient that the email has arrived. [34] 
 The DNS MX records can be tampered. In that case, the sender’s email server 
supposes, that the destination email server is the correct one, even if it could be the at-
tacker’s fake email server. [34] 
 DNSSEC provides methods to prevent fake DNS MX records. By using DNS-
SEC, the DNS data is integrated and the sender can be sure, that the location of the des-
tination email server, announced in the DNS MX record, is correct. [34] 
 The transmission between the sender’s MTA and the receiver’s MTA is usually 
still insecure and can be easily eavesdropped. It is possible to use SMTP over the en-
crypted TLS connection, but it is rarely used. Even if the TLS connection is in use, it 
still does not prevent the Man-in-the-Middle attacks. Because the server serves both 
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TLS and non-TLS clients, it uses the SMTP STARTTLS command to begin the nego-
tiation for the shared secret. This command allows the Man-in-the-Middle to downgrade 
the connection from the encrypted TLS to the plaintext TCP. This method is seen in 
Figure 21. 
 
3: Plaintext e-mail
1: STARTTLS
Man-in-the-Middle Receiver’s MTASender’s MTA
2: TLS not available due to temporary reason
 
Figure 21. STARTTLS downgrade attack. 
 
The attacker just replies “TLS not available due to temporary reason” to the START-
TLS command and the sender usually continues the transmission without the TLS en-
cryption. The encrypted TLS is dismissed. [33; 34] 
 
3.4.2 SMTP with DANE 
The Internet Draft for the SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS [33] provides a 
method for SMTP to prevent a Man-in-the-Middle downgrade attack. This method is 
based on the DANE TLSA record.  
 The entire security basis relies on the reliable and hierarchical DNSSEC, which 
provides authentic MX records. By using these MX records, the client can locate the 
target server's IP address and can begin to negotiate a TLS connection. When DANE is 
in use, the TLS connection is enforced. The sender's MTA receives the target server's 
TLSA record from the target zone's DNSSEC validated name server. This TLSA record 
is used to verify the target server's certificate in the TLS handshake process. The verifi-
cation must pass to proceed to an encrypted connection. If the verification fails, the 
connection is lost and the email is not transmitted. 
 With DANE, SMTP over TLS is downgrade-resistant and immune to the Man-
in-the-Middle attacks. DANE allows, and it is also highly recommended to use, self-
signed certificates, which leave the third party CAs off when building the TLS connec-
tion. The negotiation of the SMTP TLS with DANE is seen in Figure 22. [33; 34] 
 
5: TCP RST
3: ServerHello, Certificate...
1: TLSA record
2: STARTTLS
Man-in-the-Middle Receiver’s MTASender’s MTA
4: Match between the certificate and 
the TLSA record fails.
 
Figure 22. Man-in-the-Middle and the SMTP TLS negotiation with DANE. 
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As it can be seen in Figure 22, the authentication fails if the attacker offers its own, fake 
certificate. The TLS negotiation and the whole TCP connection fails if the attacker tries 
to prevent the encryption and to downgrade the security level from secret to plaintext. 
 
3.4.3 TLSA Record Format for SMTP 
The format of the TLSA record for SMTP is similar to the TLSA format presented in 
Figure 20. The certificate usage field format, presented in Table 1, the selector field 
format, presented in Table 2, and the matching type field format, presented in Table 3 
have the same semantics as the TLSA record but there are a few exceptions in the certif-
icate usage field. The SMTP servers should not publish the TLSA records with the cer-
tificate usage 0 or 1. These certificate usages are undefined for the SMTP clients. It is 
not possible for the SMTP clients to easily maintain a fully completed list of the trusted, 
third party CAs and these certificate usages do not offer any added security. [33] 
 The example TLSA record has a SHA-256 hash of the domain administrator's 
own full certificate 
 
 _25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA ( 
   3 0 1  cc44bab95b9d6e28848cb9bed1c16e73 
   c7712be73097d9d5851bd553489a2a5d ) 
 
The domain name prefix contains the port number on which the TLS service exists. It is 
25, when SMTP is in use and the port number is the left-most label indicated with the 
underscore character. The transport protocol name, which is used in the communication, 
is TCP, and the protocol name is the second left-most label also indicated with the un-
derscore character. The domain name is the corresponding TLS mail server’s fully qual-
ified DNS domain name. The “IN” indicates the Internet class value. TLSA is the 
RRtype. The hash is added to the Certificate Association Data field. [33] 
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4 SMTP WITH DANE IN PRACTICE 
This chapter introduces the steps, which were taken on the way to implement a test en-
vironment. This platform was needed to test the DANE protocol in practice over the 
encrypted SMTP traffic. 
 
4.1 Foreknowledge 
For this Master of Science Thesis, a small test environment was built, which offered a 
possibility to perform several tests for DNS, DNSSEC, SMTP, TLS and DANE. The 
test environment was built by using Oracle's VirtualBox software version 4.3.8. There 
were no fully complete and ready-to-use test platforms so the environment was built and 
designed out of the blue. There were a lot of tutorials and configure tips, which were 
used to build the subsystems, such as DNS, DNSSEC, SMTP and its TLS support and 
finally, with the combination of all of these subsystems, its DANE support.  
 
4.2 Test Environment Basics 
The test environment was built by using four different virtual PCs. Two of these PCs 
(PC A and PC B) were using the Ubuntu Server 13.10 (Saucy Salamander) operating 
system and the other two (PC C and PC D) were using the Ubuntu Server 14.04 Trusty 
Tahr) operating system. The test environment was built and configured as it is shown in 
Figure 23. 
 
PC A
PC C
PC B
Eth 1: 10.0.0.1/24
PC D
Eth 1: 10.0.0.2/24
Eth 2: 10.0.1.1/24 Eth 3: 10.0.2.1/24
Eth 1: 10.0.1.2/24 Eth 1: 10.0.2.2/24
Eth 2: 10.0.3.1/24 Eth 2: 10.0.3.2/24
 
Figure 23. The physical virtual test environment network topology. 
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All the PCs also had a bridged network adapter, which was connected to the Internet. 
That bridged network adapter was only used to install all the required software and ap-
plications to the virtual computers. That is why it was left out of the physical network 
topology picture shown in Figure 23. All the other network adapters were VirtualBox 
Host-Only Ethernet Adapters, which were the new software interfaces created by Virtu-
alBox. 
 PC A was working as an authoritative name server for the example.com and the 
example.org zones, PC B was working as a security-aware DNS resolver for the exam-
ple.com and the example.org zones, PC C was working as a mail server for the exam-
ple.com zone and PC D was working as a mail server for the example.org zone. PC B 
was also working as a default gateway for the PC C and PC D, but for the clarity and the 
packet capturing, a direct connection was built between the mail servers. That connec-
tion mirrors the path over the Internet. 
 After the network adapter configuration, the logical virtual test environment 
network topology was as it is shown in Figure 24. 
 
Name Servermail.example.com
DNS Resolver
mail.example.org
example.com example.org
DNS Resolver  
Figure 24. The logical virtual test environment network topology. 
 
As it is seen in Figure 24, the only physical DNS resolver transformed into two differ-
ent, logical DNS resolvers. 
 The goal was to transmit encrypted email between PC C and PC D. The encrypt-
ed connection was supposed to be implemented by using the SMTP TLS encryption and 
authenticated by using DANE and its DNSSEC validated TLSA records.  
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4.3 Configuring DNS 
When an email is sent, the sender's MTA wants to know, where the email should be 
sent, so it begins the DNS query. With this query, it tries to resolve the target mail serv-
er's IP address. 
 The first task was to implement a fully functional DNS for the test environment. 
The DNS hierarchy was the lowest possible one, as it includes one depth level, one 
name server. This name server was working as an authoritative server, so it was respon-
sible for the example.com zone and the example.org zone. 
 
4.3.1 Name Server 
The software, which was used to provide DNS name service, was Name Server Daemon 
(NSD) version 3.2.15 implemented by NLnet Labs. NSD was installed to PC A. 
 The configuration file, nsd.conf, was modified so that the NSD server will bind 
to the IP-address 10.0.0.1 and the port 53. The used zone names were example.com and 
example.org and the corresponding zone files were example.com.zone and exam-
ple.org.zone. For the reverse lookups, the in-addr.arpa names and zones, related to the 
mail.example.com and the mail.example.org servers, were also added to the configura-
tion file: the name 1.3.0.10.in-addr.arpa and the zone file com.reverse to the 
mail.example.com server and the name 2.3.0.10.in-addr.arpa and the zone file 
org.reverse to the mail.example.org server. 
 Each of the zone files were created and configured depending on the particular 
zone and its specifications. In the zone file for the example.com zone, there was an NS 
record related to the ns.example.com, an MX record related to the mail.example.com 
and A records for both of them. In the zone file for the example.org zone, there was an 
NS record related to the ns.example.org, an MX record related to the mail.example.org 
and A records for both of them. In the zone files for the reverse lookups, there was a 
pointer record from the corresponding in-addr.arpa name to the host name related to it. 
[36] 
 
4.3.2 DNS Resolver 
Unbound version 1.4.20, developed by NLnet Labs, was used as a proper validating, 
recursive and caching DNS resolver. The DNSSEC and DANE aware Unbound resolver 
was installed to the PC B.  
 The configuration file, unbound.conf, was modified to activate server interfaces 
10.0.1.1 and 10.0.2.1 to listen to the client DNS queries to the port 53. Stub zones for 
the example.com, example.org and the 10.in-addr.arpa names were added and the same 
stub address for all of them was the IP-address of the name server, 10.0.0.1 and its port 
53. [37] 
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4.4 Configuring DNSSEC 
The NSD server and the Unbound resolver were started and the fully functional DNS 
was running. The next task was to enhance the system by bringing DNSSEC along and 
signing all the DNS data by using it. The NSD software was already DNSSEC-aware so 
the main task was to issue proper keys, which were then used for signing the DNS data.  
 
4.4.1 Keys and Signing 
The tool ldns-keygen was used to generate the ZSK and the KSK key pairs for both of 
the zones, the example.com zone and the example.org zone. After the generation pro-
cess, three files, a public key, a private key and a DS file, were generated for each zone 
and for each key type. 
 The next step was to use these keys for signing the DNS zone file. The tool, 
which was used for the signing process, was ldns-signzone. The program needs the path 
of the zone file, the path of the KSK key pair and the path of the ZSK key pair as the 
input arguments and then, as the output, it generates the signed zone file. The output 
format is .signed, so for the example.com.zone file, the signed version would be exam-
ple.com.zone.signed. 
 
4.4.2 Implementation 
The location of the zone files had to be changed to the configuration file nsd.conf so that 
they would correspond with the signed zone files. The trust anchors, which in this case 
were the public KSK keys from each zone, had to be added to the DNS resolver's un-
bound.conf configuration file. After the restart of the NSD server and the DNS resolver 
the DNSSEC implementation was in action. [36; 37] 
 
4.5 Postfix Mail Services 
The program, which was used to provide the necessary email services between PC C 
and PC D, was Postfix, which was originally developed by Wietse Venema in 1997. 
Specifically for this test environment, Postfix's latest version 2.11.0 was used because of 
its DANE support. 
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4.5.1 Basic Configuration 
The Postfix software was installed to PC C and PC D and the basic configurations were 
set. The mail server configuration type was set to Internet Site, which allowed sending 
and receiving mail directly by using SMTP. The domain for example.com was exam-
ple.com, the corresponding network and netmask was 10.0.1.0/24 and the user was Al-
ice. The corresponding configurations for the example.org domain were example.org, 
10.0.2.0/24 and Bob. Postfix uses mbox as a default mailbox format so it was used in 
this experiment. [38] 
 When the Postfix service was started, it was possible to send email from Alice to 
Bob and vice versa, but the email traffic and packets were plaintext.  
 
4.5.2 Creating a Certificate 
The next task was to implement the encryption between the sender's MTA and receiver's 
MTA by using TLS. Because TLS uses PKI and certificates, the first step, while gener-
ating an own self-signed certificate, was to generate a key. The tool openssl was used to 
generate a private key for both of the mail servers. The next step was to generate a cer-
tificate signing request for both of the mail servers by using the previously generated 
key and the openssl tool. The generation process requests to enter a Country Name, a 
State Name, a Locality Name, an Organization Name, an Organizational Unit Name, a 
Common Name, an Email Address and a few extra attributes. As a result, the generation 
process produced a certificate signing request, which can be used to create an own self-
signed certificate. 
 To generate an own self-signed certificate, the openssl tool was used. It takes the 
previously generated key and the certificate signing request as an input and generates a 
certificate as an output. The certificate generations were made to both mail servers. The 
server certificate file was copied to path 
 
  /etc/ssl/certs 
 
and the private key file to path 
 
  /etc/ssl/private, 
 
from where any application, when configured, can use them. [39] 
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4.5.3 Enabling Encryption 
When enabling Postfix to provide the TLS encryption, the Postfix's configuration file 
main.cf had to be modified with at least the following configuration additions. The cli-
ent's SMTP TLS security level was set to the mandatory encryption by adding a 
 
 smtp_tls_security_level = encrypt 
 
line to the configuration file. The server's SMTP TLS security level was set to the man-
datory encryption by adding a 
 
 smtpd_tls_security_level = encrypt 
 
line to the configuration file. This addition means that the server forces clients to use 
TLS encryption. If the client can not provide encryption, the email is not delivered. That 
is why this addition should be used only on proper dedicated mail servers. 
 The locations of the server's certificate and private key had to be added to the 
configuration file. The path of the certificate file was set by adding a 
 
 smtpd_tls_cert_file = /etc/ssl/certs/server.crt 
 
line to the configuration file, informing that the server's certificate was in the file named 
server.crt. The path of the private key file was set by adding a 
 
 smtpd_tls_key_file = /etc/ssl/private/server.key 
 
line, also informing that the server's private key file was named server.key. After these 
additions, which were made to both mail servers, the Postfix services were restarted and 
tested. The test proved that the TLS connection was negotiated before the email was 
sent. [38; 40] 
 
4.5.4 DANE TLS Authentication 
The implemented test platform offered a good basis for increasing security by involving 
DANE. The Postfix SMTP client supports the opportunistic dane level and the manda-
tory dane-only level, which are both based on the DANE TLSA records. The opportun-
istic dane level allows the security level to downgrade itself if TLSA records are not 
found. That is why the mandatory dane-only level was used in this test environment, 
because it requires the TLSA authentication and there are no fallbacks. 
 The client's SMTP TLS security level had to be changed from encrypt to dane-
only. This change was made by modifying the line from the file main.cf as follows 
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 smtp_tls_security_level = dane-only. 
 
The client's DNS support level had to be set to enable DNSSEC lookups. This was 
made by adding a  
 
 smtp_dns_support_level = dnssec 
 
line to the configuration file. Any DNS MX and address queries from now on request 
DNSSEC-validated responses. This method required, that a 
 
 smtp_host_lookup = dns 
 
line was set and the hosts were able to be found by using DNS. These changes and addi-
tions were made to both mail servers, and at the end the Postfix services were restarted. 
[40] 
 To provide the DANE TLS authentication, it is also required, that the TLSA 
record related to the particular mail server's certificate is found from the corresponding 
DNS zone file. To meet this requirement a  
 
 _25._tcp.mail.example.com. IN TLSA ( 
  3 0 1  cc44bab95b9d6e28848cb9bed1c16e73 
   c7712be73097d9d5851bd553489a2a5d ) 
 
line was added to the example.com.zone file and a 
 
  
 _25._tcp.mail.example.org. IN TLSA ( 
  3 0 1 f9a52ee9cfa806f7eee68a819ff61e3e 
   b89fef8ff9b955ec129b3a3ee5a88c33 ) 
 
line was added to the example.org.zone file. 
 Because the DNS zone files were modified, they had to be signed again by using 
the ldns-signzone tool introduced in Section 4.4.1. After the signing process, the NSD 
had to be restarted once more. While running again, the fully functional DNS with 
DNSSEC validation, and a couple of mail servers with SMTP over TLS with DANE 
authentication, were ready to be tested. 
 
4.6 Testing phase 
Before tests with sending and receiving the encrypted emails, responses to the DNS 
lookups, with DNSSEC and TLSA records, were tested by using a dig tool. The 
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mail.example.org server lookup from the mail.example.com server is shown in Figure 
25. 
 
 
Figure 25. A screenshot of the DNS lookup from mail.example.com to mail.example.org with DNS-
SEC and TLSA record. 
 
In the answer section, the TLSA record, related to the TLSA RR introduced in Chapter 
4.5.4, and its signature, RRSIG, are seen. DO bit is set. AD bit is also set, but it is not 
seen in the figure. The mail.example.com server lookup from the mail.example.org 
server is shown in Figure 26. 
 
 
Figure 26. A screenshot of the DNS lookup from mail.example.org to mail.example.com with DNS-
SEC and TLSA record. 
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The correct answer section details and the corresponding TLSA RR, related to the value 
introduced in Chapter 4.5.4, are also seen in Figure 26.  
 DNS with DNSSEC and TLSA records appeared to be working as they should. 
The next step was to begin tests with encrypted emails. The Wireshark Network Ana-
lyzer program version 1.10.6 was used for analyzing the network traffic and capturing 
the data packet flows. VirtualBox Host-Only Network interface was set to be the only 
interface to capture from. With that capture option, Wireshark was aware of all the traf-
fic in the virtual test environment. 
 For the tests, the caches were emptied. Once the services were running, the tests 
were begun. The tool, which was used to send an email, was mail. With a command 
 
 mail bob@example.org 
 
Alice sent an email to Bob, whose mailbox was at mail.example.org server. In Table 4, 
the DNS queries and responses before transmitting the email are seen. 
 
Table 4. Captured DNS queries and responses from mail.example.com with DNSSEC and TLSA 
record. 
No. Time Source Destina-
tion 
Proto-
col 
Length Info 
1 0.000000 10.0.1.2 10.0.1.1 DNS 82 Standard query 0x47b3  MX example.org 
2 0.012227 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.1 DNS 82 Standard query 0x3977  MX example.org 
3 0.012991 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 DNS 488 Standard query response 0x3977  MX 10 mail.example.org 
RRSIG 
4 0.020524 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.1 DNS 82 Standard query 0x9f52  DNSKEY example.org 
5 0.021901 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 DNS 816 Standard query response 0x9f52  DNSKEY DNSKEY RRSIG 
6 0.084370 10.0.1.1 10.0.1.2 DNS 488 Standard query response 0x47b3  MX 10 mail.example.org 
RRSIG 
7 0.086053 10.0.1.2 10.0.1.1 DNS 87 Standard query 0x751a  A mail.example.org 
8 0.091158 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.1 DNS 87 Standard query 0xf8f2  A mail.example.org 
9 0.091628 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 DNS 388 Standard query response 0xf8f2  A 10.0.3.2 RRSIG 
10 0.095188 10.0.1.1 10.0.1.2 DNS 388 Standard query response 0x751a  A 10.0.3.2 RRSIG 
11 0.101587 10.0.1.2 10.0.1.1 DNS 87 Standard query 0xca0b  AAAA mail.example.org 
12 0.103837 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.1 DNS 87 Standard query 0x3bc7  AAAA mail.example.org 
13 0.104315 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 DNS 347 Standard query response 0x3bc7  
14 0.108671 10.0.1.1 10.0.1.2 DNS 347 Standard query response 0xca0b  
15 0.112271 10.0.1.2 10.0.1.1 DNS 96 Standard query 0x1990  TLSA _25._tcp.mail.example.org 
16 0.113822 10.0.0.2 10.0.0.1 DNS 96 Standard query 0x2a79  TLSA _25._tcp.mail.example.org 
17 0.114275 10.0.0.1 10.0.0.2 DNS 428 Standard query response 0x2a79  TLSA 
_25._tcp.mail.example.org RRSIG 
18 0.117255 10.0.1.1 10.0.1.2 DNS 428 Standard query response 0x1990  TLSA 
_25._tcp.mail.example.org RRSIG 
 
There were also queries for the IPv6 addresses, but the AAAA records were not config-
ured to the servers. The answer section of the packet 18, which was a response to the 
TLSA query, included following descriptions: 
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 _25._tcp.mail.example.org: type TLSA, class IN 
  Name: _25._tcp.mail.example.org 
  Type: TLSA (TLSA) 
  Class: IN (0x0001) 
  Time to live: 1 day 
  Data length: 35 
  Certificate Usage: Domain-issued certificate (3) 
  Selector: Full certificate (0) 
  Matching Type: SHA-256 (1) 
  Certificate Association Data:f9a52ee9cfa806f7eee68a819ff61e3e 
      b89fef8ff9b955ec129b3a3ee5a88c33 
 
It related to the TLSA RR introduced in Section 4.5.4. The answer section also included 
the signed TLSA RRSIG, which is described below. 
 
 
 
 
 _25._tcp.mail.example.org: type RRSIG, class IN 
  Name: _25._tcp.mail.example.org 
  Type: RRSIG (RR signature) 
  Class: IN (0x0001) 
  Time to live: 1 day 
  Data length: 72 
  Type Covered: 52 (TLSA (TLSA)) 
  Algorithm: DSA (3) 
  Labels: 5 
  Original TTL: 86400 (1 day) 
  Signature Expiration: May  2, 2014 17:25:00 
  Signature Inception: Apr  4, 2014 17:25:00 
  Key Tag: 33777 
  Signer's name: example.org 
  Signature:   00b307e5d9dec85896e92eaeb46e 
    cec895766ebabd36739c1a4a84fd 
    7666ded6fcf94a2c59a3b70c56 
 
When the location of the mail.example.org server was resolved, it was possible to begin 
with the email transmission. In Table 5, the beginning of the TLS handshake is seen. 
The TCP three-way handshake has already been negotiated in previous packets, and the 
connection to the mail.example.org server has been formed. 
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Table 5. Captured TLS negotiation from mail.example.com to mail.example.org. 
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 
32 0.439681 10.0.3.2 10.0.3.1 SMTP 111 S: 220 mail.example.org ESMTP Postfix (Ubuntu) 
33 0.442237 10.0.3.1 10.0.3.2 TCP 66 40331 > smtp [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=46 Win=29248 Len=0 
TSval=35852082 TSecr=34752520 
34 0.443228 10.0.3.1 10.0.3.2 SMTP 89 C: EHLO mail.example.com 
35 0.443470 10.0.3.2 10.0.3.1 TCP 66 smtp > 40331 [ACK] Seq=46 Ack=24 Win=28992 Len=0 
TSval=34752521 TSecr=35852082 
36 0.444588 10.0.3.2 10.0.3.1 SMTP 205 S: 250 mail.example.org |  250 PIPELINING |  250 SIZE 
10240000 |  250 VRFY |  250 ETRN |  250 STARTTLS |  250 
ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES |  250 8BITMIME |  250 DSN 
37 0.445460 10.0.3.1 10.0.3.2 SMTP 76 C: STARTTLS 
38 0.446017 10.0.3.2 10.0.3.1 SMTP 96 S: 220 2.0.0 Ready to start TLS 
39 0.451906 10.0.3.1 10.0.3.2 TLSv1.2 392 Client Hello 
40 0.464818 10.0.3.2 10.0.3.1 TLSv1.2 1497 Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello 
Done 
41 0.471663 10.0.3.1 10.0.3.2 TLSv1.2 192 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Hand-
shake Message 
42 0.474789 10.0.3.2 10.0.3.1 TLSv1.2 117 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 
43 0.477210 10.0.3.1 10.0.3.2 TLSv1.2 118 Application Data 
44 0.486165 10.0.3.2 10.0.3.1 TLSv1.2 220 Application Data 
 
When the encrypted email was completely sent, the TLS and TCP connections were 
closed. 
 It was confirmed from the mail.example.org server, that the encrypted email 
from Alice had arrived to Bob. A screenshot is seen in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27. A screenshot of Bob's mailbox. 
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It can be seen from the figure, that the TLSv1.2 encryption with a certain cipher suite 
was used to encrypt this particular email. The email transmission was also tested in the 
opposite direction, from Bob to Alice, by using a command 
 
 mail alice@example.com 
 
and the received test results were consistent. 
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5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter introduces the current state, considers the results, which were found during 
the testing phase while encrypted email was tested, and discusses the importance of the 
additions and the results. 
 
5.1 Current State 
The methods of DNSSEC significantly improve the security and the reliability of the 
DNS. Even if DNSSEC has a few minor disadvantages, such as the complexity and the 
slowing effect to the overall processes, its benefits are so enormous, that it has gained a 
ground on the Internet as can be seen in Table 6, where the top 20 countries using 
DNSSEC on July 2013, are listed. 
 
Table 6. Where is DNSSEC used? - The Top 20 [modified from 17, p. 12]. 
Rank CC Count DNSSEC Mixed  None Country  
1 SE 5,349 77.92 3.38 18.70 Sweden  
2 SI 4,758 58.85 4.90 36.25 Slovenia  
3 LU 652 43.87 6.90 49.23 Luxembourg  
4 VN 26,665 38.28 4.04 57.69 Vietnam  
5 FI 2,456 37.01 16.29 46.70 Finland  
6 CZ 30,827 33.20 8.08 58.72 Czech Republic  
7 CL 46,151 30.26 8.34 61.41 Chile  
8 JM 1,545 28.22 3.11 68.67 Jamaica  
9 IE 8,079 27.94 3.11 68.96 Ireland  
10 BB 1,312 24.24 1.52 74.24 Barbados  
11 ID 54,816 23.87 8.58 67.55 Indonesia  
12 UA 26,399 21.65 12.75 65.60 Ukraine  
13 ZA 2,969 21.15 9.36 69.48 South Africa  
14 TR 49,498 18.06 2.10 79.84 Turkey  
15 US 140,234 17.32 3.57 79.11 United States of America  
16 EG 36,061 14.68 10.32 75.01 Egypt  
17 GH 973 14.59 8.12 77.29 Ghana  
18 AZ 7,409 14.55 30.34 55.11 Azerbaijan  
19 BR 179,424 14.43 6.13 79.44 Brazil  
20 PS 2,893 14.00 36.85 49.15 Occupied Palestinian Territory  
 
In Table 6, the “DNSSEC” means, how many percent of clients appear to use the DNS-
SEC-validating resolvers. The “Mixed” means, how many percent of clients use a mix 
of DNSSEC-validating resolvers and non-validating resolvers. The “None” means, how 
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many percent of clients use the non-validating resolvers. Sweden is clearly the most 
advanced country on this market area. 
 On the website of the DNS and Domain Name Statistics and Tools (statdns) 
[18], there are listed all the 249 countries and their ccTLDs and only 90 of them (the 
ratio is 36.14%) have been signed by using DNSSEC. 
 Finland's ccTLD, .fi has been signed, but from the next level domains below it, 
only very few of them have been signed. There are, for example, only two banks in Fin-
land, which have a signed domain name, Ålandsbanken and Danske Bank. This was 
validated in April 2014 by using Mozilla Firefox's plugin DNSSEC/TLSA Validator 
version 2.1.1, developed by CZ. NIC Labs. This plugin can also validate possible TLSA 
records within. 
 Finnish banks were asked via their own web site's contact forms about DNSSEC 
and in addition especially those banks, which do not use DNSSEC, were asked why is it 
not in use. First of all, of the banks, which already use DNSSEC, one did not answer  at 
all and the other was not able to comment on its security solutions. From the banks, 
which do not use DNSSEC, a few did not answer. Some of those who answered, for 
example LähiTapiola,  have considered DNSSEC, but have left it until further notice 
because in Finland, major security risks in DNS have not been detected. Also Osuus-
pankki have considered DNSSEC, but left it like LähiTapiola. Though, they have some 
other features for compensating DNSSEC, they were not able to comment further. For 
Aktia Bank, DNSSEC is a part of their broader security planning. Usage of DANE was 
also checked by using the DNSSEC/TLSA Validator, but none of the Finnish banks 
were using a TLSA records. All of these details are referring to the answers got via 
email. 
 
5.2 Performance 
Some of the key features related to the DNS queries and responses, introduced in Table 
4, are gathered in Table 7. The results were considered from two different points of 
view: DNSSEC without DANE and DNSSEC with DANE. Their difference is an-
nounced and the ratio is calculated, which was a result of the values with DANE divided 
to the values without DANE. 
 
Table 7. The comparison of the DNSSEC query with and without DANE. 
 Without DANE With DANE Difference Ratio 
Number of packets 14 18 4 1.29 
Number of bytes 3856 bytes 4904 bytes 1048 bytes 1.27 
Elapsed time 108ms 117ms 9ms 1.07 
  
It is seen from the table, that even if there were almost a 30% increase in the number of 
packets and the number of bytes, the most critical value, the elapsed time, only in-
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creased by 7%. The elapsed times, during the several tests, were close to the measured 
value in Table 7. The test environment was simplified for measurements so it is ex-
pected, that slight variance may occur in the real network environment. The number of 
packets and bytes in a DNS query depends highly on the DNS's hierarchy and the 
elapsed time varies. Although, the TLSA record is stored in the name server, which ad-
ministers the domain. The same delays would occur for the DNS responses as would for 
the TLSA responses, so the ratio should be relatively close to the measured value.  
5.3 Certificate Packets 
The Wireshark Packet Analyzer was used to capture TLS handshake packets, while 
connecting to various web sites. The web sites facebook.com, google.com and op.fi 
were used for testing. Of the captured packets, it was focused on the certificate packets 
and especially the lengths of including certificates and depths of the certificate chains. 
The captured certificate from mail.example.org was used as a reference. The captured 
packet is seen in Table 5 and the corresponding packet number is 40. Out of the total 
amount of 1497 bytes the share of the certificate is 970 bytes. The discovered certificate 
packet lengths and possible certificate chains are gathered in Table 8. 
 
Table 8. Captured TLS handshake certificate packets. 
 example.org facebook.com google.com op.fi 
Cert #1 Self-Signed 
Certificate  
970 bytes 
facebook.com 
Certificate 
1375 bytes 
google.com 
Certificate 
1669 bytes 
op.fi 
Certificate 
1469 bytes 
Cert #2 - DigiCert High 
Assurance 
G2 CA-3 
1628 bytes 
Google Internet 
Authority G2 
 
1032 bytes 
VeriSign Class 3 
Extended Valida-
tion SSL CA 
1512 bytes 
Cert #3 - - GeoTrust Global 
CA 
 
897 bytes 
VeriSign Class 3 
Public Primary 
Certification 
1236 bytes 
Total 970 bytes 3003 bytes 3598 bytes 4217 bytes 
 
It is clearly seen in Table 8 that the self-signed certificate used as reference, which did 
not have a certificate chain, is the smallest packet and it therefore creates the smallest 
load to the network. The tested web sites had at least three times larger certificate pack-
ets. This correlates directly with the network traffic.  
 The total number of bytes, including the test phase's TLS handshake, is 2370 
bytes. This was calculated from Table 5 starting from the packet number 37 and ending 
with the packet number 42. The share of the certificate is over 40 percent in this case, 
where the certificate is only as small as 970 bytes. Reducing 77 percent out of this 
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owned 40 percent share would mean a 30 percent reduction out of the entire certificate 
packet.  
 If the size of the certificate is 4217 bytes, the size of the certificate packet would 
be 4744 bytes in this case and the total number of bytes of the TLS handshake would be 
5617 bytes. The share of the certificate would then already be a 75 percent out of the 
entire TLS handshake. 
 According to Table 7, the DANE implementation will increase the DNS traffic 
by 27 percent and 1048 bytes, but according to Table 8, it could instead reduce the size 
of the certificate packet by even 77 percent and 3247 bytes. The total number of bytes, 
when the certificate of op.fi is used (DANE is not in use), is 9473 bytes. The total num-
ber of bytes, when both, the self-signed certificate and DANE, are used, is 7274 bytes. 
The total reduction is 2199 bytes, which means a reduction of over 23 percent to the 
entire DNS and TLS handshake traffic. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
Implementing DANE is not complex. It only requires a TLSA record, which can easily 
be computed from the certificate. The calculated TLSA record is then copied to the 
DNS zone file and the DNS zone file is signed by using the DNSSEC methods. Because 
the DNS zone is necessary in order to sign again after every modification, it would be 
wise to schedule the future TLSA record rollovers at the same time with the DNSSEC 
key rollovers. 
 DANE limits the trust for only the parties who administrate the target DNS zone 
and its parent zones. DANE trusts the hierarchical chain of trust, where all the security 
is based on one trust anchor, for example, the root. There will not be a need anymore for 
hundreds of public Certification Authorities. This is emphasized with the connection of 
machine to machine (M2M) in the Internet of Things (IoT) as there will be no humans 
confirming untrusted certificates. Everything just has to work. Usually the case is, that 
the whole authentication process is missing.  
 For improving the existing performance and decreasing the delays, it could be a 
fine improvement, if the TLSA record was attached to the first DNS reply with an A or 
AAAA record, so there would be no need to request the TLSA records afterwards. If 
DNSSEC is in use, one option could be to send the DNS queries simultaneously. The 
first one queries the A or AAAA record and the second one queries the TLSA record. 
This would also reduce the delays since the scenarios, where there are no A or AAAA 
records, are unlikely. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this Master of Science Thesis was to study the DANE protocol and its major 
applications. DANE is a protocol, which uses TLSA records to associate a TLS certifi-
cate's data to the existing, hierarchical and reliable DNSSEC. From the M2M point of 
view, the main interest of this study was to research the DANE-validated TLS encryp-
tion between email servers. 
 DANE has been known to provide improved security and verification for TLS 
connections. As demonstrated earlier, DANE prevents the Man-in-the-Middle attack 
while negotiating an encrypted SMTP connection. One of the biggest advantages of this 
security improvement is that it allows the use of self-signed certificates, which means 
that the purpose of the third party CAs would significantly decrease. The self-signed 
certificates, DNSSEC and DANE combined enable the TLS encryption and authentica-
tion to all services, and especially to those parties who, in the past, have needed a CA to 
achieve just confidentiality. 
 In Chapter 4, the implementation of DANE, especially when used with encrypt-
ed email, was tested. The test results, presented in Chapter 5, proved that if there is al-
ready an existing DNSSEC, the implementation of DANE is not complex and does not 
require advanced expertise. The addition of DANE does not increase the delays or the 
number of bytes in DNS queries significantly. Actually, the addition of DANE could 
even decrease the total number of bytes during the TLS handshake, when a self-signed 
certificate is used instead of a certificate issued by a third party CA. The reduction in 
the number of bytes, due to the use of a self-signed certificate, will compensate the in-
crease in the number of bytes in DNS traffic. Overall, the process could require even 23 
percent less bytes. 
 The study has shown, that DANE is a recommended technique to put into ser-
vice immediately after the organization's DNSSEC launch. DANE provides good extra 
security for encrypted web sites and email transmissions, which TLS and DNSSEC 
alone can not offer. 
 
 50 
REFERENCES 
 
[1] Dierks, T., Rescorla, E., The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2, 
IETF RFC 5246, August 2008. Available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246. 
 
[2] Cisco Security Intelligence Operations, DNS Best Practices, Network Protections, 
and Attack Identification, [accessed on 19.10.2013], available at: 
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/dns-bcp.html. 
 
[3] Australian Government Intelligence Agency – Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), 
Domain Name System (DNS) Security Strategies, August 2012, [accessed on 
21.10.2013], available at: 
http://www.asd.gov.au/publications/csocprotect/dns_security.htm. 
 
[4] Mockapetris, P., Domain Names – Implementation and Specification, IETF RFC 
1035, November 1987. Available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035. 
 
[5] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., Rose, S., DNS Security Introduc-
tion and Requirements, IETF RFC 4033, March 2005. Available at: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4033. 
 
[6] DNSSEC: DNS Security Extensions, Securing the Domain Name System, [accessed 
on 1.11.2013], available at: http://www.dnssec.net/. 
 
[7] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., Rose, S., Resource Records for the 
DNS Security Extensions, IETF RFC 4034, March 2005. Available at: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4034. 
 
[8] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., Rose, S., Protocol Modifications 
for the DNS Security Extensions, IETF RFC 4035, March 2005. Available at: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4035. 
 
[9] Conrad, D., Indicating Resolver Support of DNSSEC, IETF RFC 3225, December 
2001. Available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3225. 
 
[10] Vixie, P., Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0), IETF RFC 2671, August 
1999. Available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2671. 
 
[11] Hopkins, A., Borne, J. C., Helping Secure the Internet with DNSSEC, September 
2010, [accessed on 18.12.2013]. Available at: 
http://www.educause.edu/ero/article/helping-secure-internet-dnssec. 
 
 51 
[12] Galvin, J., Why DNSSEC?, November 2013, [accessed on 15.1.2014]. Available at: 
http://www.slideshare.net/Deploy360/ion-toronto-why-implement-dnssec.  
 
[13] Mohan, R., Five Strategies for Flawless DNSSEC Key Management and Rollovers, 
July 2010, [accessed on 15.1.2014]. Available at: http://www.securityweek.com/five-
strategies-flawless-dnssec-key-management-and-rollover.  
 
[14] Kolkman, O., RIPE NCC PROJECT, DNSSEC Key Management and Zone Sign-
ing, [accessed on 15.1.2014]. Available at: http://www.ripe.net/data-
tools/projects/archive/disi/dnssec-key-management-and-zone-signing. 
 
[15] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., Gieben, R., DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 
2, IETF RFC 6781, December 2012. Available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6781. 
 
[16] EDUCAUSE, 7 Things You Should Know About DNSSEC, January 2010, [accessed 
on 22.1.2014]. Available at: https://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/EST1001.pdf. 
 
[17] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Measuring DNSSEC use, July 2013, [accessed on 
23.1.2014]. Available at: http://iepg.org/2013-07-ietf87/2013-07-28-dnssec.pdf. 
 
[18] Website of statdns, DNS and Domain Name Statistics and Tools – List of ccTLDs, 
[accessed on 23.1.2014]. Available at: http://www.statdns.com/cctlds/. 
 
[19] Mills, E., McCullagh, D., CNET News – Google, Yahoo, Skype targeted in attack 
linked to Iran, March 2011, [accessed on 23.1.2014]. Available at: 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20046340-281.html. 
 
[20] Mills, E., CNET News - Fraudulent Google certificate points to Internet attacks, 
August 2011, [accessed on 23.1.2014]. Available at: http://news.cnet.com/8301-
27080_3-20098894-245/fraudulent-google-certificate-points-to-internet-attack/. 
 
[21] Gieben, R., Chain of Trust – The parent-child and keyholder-keysigner relations 
and their communication in DNSSEC, January 2013, [accessed on 30.1.2014]. Available 
at: http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/publications/CSI-report.pdf. 
 
[22] Hoffman, P., Schlyter, J., The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities 
(DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TSLA, IETF RFC 6698, August 
2012. Available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6698. 
 
[23] Cooper, D., et al., Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certifi-
cate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, IETF RFC 5280, May 2008. Available at: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280. 
 52 
 
[24] Eastlake 3
rd
, D., Hansen, T., US Secure Hash Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based 
HMAC and HKDF), IETF RFC 6234, May 2011. Available at: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6234. 
 
[25] Barnes, R. L., The IETF Journal, DANE: Taking TLS Authentication to the Next 
Level Using DNSSEC, October 2011, [accessed on 31.1.2014]. Available at: 
http://www.internetsociety.org/articles/dane-taking-tls-authentication-next-level-using-
dnssec. 
 
[26] Gudmundsson, O., Adding acronyms to simplify DANE conversations draft-ietf-
dane-registry-acronyms-04, IETF Internet-Draft, February 2014. Available at: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-registry-acronyms-04. 
 
[27] Ramsdell, B., Turner, S., Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) 
Version 3.2 Message Specification, IETF RFC 5751 , January 2010. Available at: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5751. 
 
[28] Hoffman, P., Schlyter, J., Using Secure DNS to Associate Certificates with Domain 
Names For S/MIME draft-ietf-dane-smime-06, IETF Internet-Draft, February 2014. 
Available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-smime-06. 
 
[29] York, D., Internet Society Deploy360 Programme, The DANE Protocol – DNS-
Based Authentication of Named Entities, October 2012, [accessed on 27.2.2014]. Avail-
able at: http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/resources/dane/. 
 
[30] Kumari, W., York, D., Internet Society Deploy360 Programme, The DANE Proto-
col: What It Is And Why It Matters (including DNSSEC, SSL/TLS) – video interview, 
August 2012, [accessed on 27.2.2014]. Available at: 
http://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/resources/dane/ or at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=emDxUQl1NvA. 
 
[31] Barnes, R. L., Internet Society Deploy360 Programme, DANE: Taking TLS Au-
thentication to the Next Level using DNSSEC, October 2011, [accessed on 27.2.2014]. 
Available at: http://www.internetsociety.org/articles/dane-taking-tls-authentication-
next-level-using-dnssec. 
 
[32] Klensin, J., Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, IETF RFC 5321 , October 2008. Avail-
able at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5321. 
 
 53 
[33] Dukhovni, V., Hardaker, W., SMTP security via opportunistic DANE TLS draft-
ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-07, IETF Internet-Draft, February 2014. Available at: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dane-smtp-with-dane-07. 
 
[34] Dukhovni, V., Hardaker, W., DANE for SMTP – IETF 87, Berlin, July 2013, [ac-
cessed on 14.3.2014]. Available at: http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/87/slides/slides-87-
dane-2.pdf. 
 
[35] Hoffman, P., SMTP Service Extension for Secure SMTP over Transport Layer Se-
curity, IETF RCF 3207, February 2002. Available at: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3207. 
 
[36] NLnet Labs, Manual for NSD configuration, March 2014, [accessed on 14.4.2014]. 
Available at: http://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/nsd/nsd.conf.5.html. 
 
[37] NLnet Labs, Tutorial for Unbound Library, March 2014, [accessed on 14.4.2014]. 
Available at: http://www.unbound.net/documentation/unbound.conf.html. 
 
[38] Ubuntu Official Documentation, Ubuntu 14.04 - Ubuntu Server Guide - Email Ser-
vices - Postfix, [accessed on 14.4.2014]. Available at: 
https://help.ubuntu.com/14.04/serverguide/postfix.html. 
 
[39] Ubuntu Official Documentation, Ubuntu 14.04 - Ubuntu Server Guide - Security - 
Certificates, [accessed on 14.4.2014]. Available at: 
https://help.ubuntu.com/14.04/serverguide/certificates-and-security.html. 
 
[40] The Postfix Home Page - Documentation: TLS Encryption and Authentication , [ac-
cessed on 15.4.2014]. Available at: http://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html. 
 
